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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals. of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 4101 
VIRGINIA: 
In .the Clerk's Office of the Supreme Court of Appeals held 
at the Court-Library Building in the City of Richmond on 
Friday the 7th day of November, 1952. 
RICHARD L. MEAGHER, ET AL., Appellants, 
against 
APPALACHIAN EL E OT RIC POWER COMP ANY, A 
CORPORATION, Appellee. 
From the Circuit Court of Roanoke County. 
This is to certify that upon the petition of Richard L. 
Meagher and Laura A. C. Meagher; Charles S. Patton, Jr., 
and ]!.,ranees S. Patton; J. Kyle Montague and Lucy M. Mon-
tague; W. Earl Allen, Jr., and Mildred H. Allen; T. J. Oran-
der and Nellie G. Oranger; Robert P. Grogan and Maude M. 
Grogan; Florence Lindem John; Lake L. Newton; George W. 
Parsons and Miriam Boyer Parsons; and Herman Weaver 
an appeal and supersedeas has been awarded by one of the 
Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia from 
a decree entered by the Circuit Court of Roanoke County on 
the 28th day of June, 1952, in a certain c1iancery cause then 
therein depending wherein said petitioners were plaintiffs 
and Appalachian Electric Power Company was defendant, 
upon the petitioners, or some one for"tbem, entering into bond 
. with suflicient surety before the clerk of the said circuit court 
in the penalty of three hundred dollars, with conditi~J'.l, · · 
law directs. · · . 
.... . 
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BILL OF COMPLAINT. 
To the Honorable T. L. Keister, Judge of said Court: 
Your complainants, Richard L. Meagher and Laura A. C. 
J\foagher, Charles S. Patton, Jr. and Frances S. Patton, J. 
Kyle Montague and Lucy J\L Montague, "\V. Earl Allen, Jr. 
and Mildred H. Allen, T. J. Orander and Nellie G. Orander, 
Robert P. Grogan and Maude M. Grog·an, Florence Lindem 
John, Lake L. Newton, George W. Parsons and Miriam Boyer 
Parsons, and Herman Weaver, respectively represent: 
1. (a) That tlle above-named complainants, excepting the 
complainants Montague, are the fee simple owners of certain 
lots or parcels of land lying in several exclusively residential 
developments and subdivisions immediately adjacent and con-
tiguous to each other in the Salem and Cave Spring Magis-
terial Districts of Roanoke County, Virginia, south of the 
Lee Highway (U.S. Route No. 11) and between one and two 
miles west of the present corporate limits of the 
page 2 ~ City of Roanoke, which lots or parcels with the 
owner thereof are identified as follows: 
GRUBB LAND DEVELOPMENT: 
Meagher A parcel on the south side of Staje Secondary 
Road Route No. 685, containing 2.05 acres of 
the Grubb Land Development and adjoining the 
west boundary of property owned by the de-
fendant corporation. 
Patton 
Allen 
A parcel on the south side of State Secondary 
Road Route No. 685, containing 1.54 acres of the 
Grubb Land Development adjoining the west 
boundary of Meagher. 
A parcel on the south side of State Secondary 
Road Route No. 685, containing· 2.52 acres of the 
Grubb Land Development lying 58 fee west of 
Patton. 
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BELLE AIR: 
0l'ander Westerly 2.40 acres of original Lot 6, being all 
of Lot 6 on the map subdividing Lots 5 and 6, 
Belle Air, and lying 301 feet east of Crestmoor 
Drive which is the east boundary of the prop-
erty owned by the defendant corporation. 
Grogan ,vesterly 3.08 acres of original Lof 10 of Belle 
Air bordering on Crestmoor Drive. · 
John Greater northerly portion of Lot 14, Belle Air, 
adjoining the south boundary of Grogan and the 
east bo.undary of property owned by the de-
fendant corporation. 
Newton Southerly portion of Lot 14, Belle Air, adjoin-
ing the south boundary of J olm. 
Parsons Part of original Lot 15 of Belle Air, being Lot 
15-0 as shown on the revised map of Lot 15 and 
lying· to the east of Newton. 
CRESTMOOR: 
·weaver Lots 7, 8, and 9, Block 2, Section 1, Crestmoor 
subdivision. 
(b) That the complainants :Montague are the former 
owners of the above-described Patton Parcel which was con-
veyed to them by deed dated .August 22, 1946, and recorded 
in Deed Book 344, Page 327 and which they conveyed to the 
Pattons by deed dated May 24, 1951 and recorded June 9, 
1951, in Deed Book 457, Page 379. 
2. That the defendant corporation is the fee simple owner 
of the following lots or parcels that are also lo-
page 3 ~ cated in the above-mentioned exclusively residen-
tial developments and subdivisions: 
(a) Brown, Parcel of 2.05 acres of the Grubb Land Develop-
ment purchased for $5,000.00 from Robert Lawrence Brown 
by deed dated .April 18, 1950, and recorded May 1, 1950, in 
Deed Book 436, Page 403, which parcel fronting on State Sec-
ondary Road Route No. 685 forms the east boundary of the 
property of the complainant l\foagher and is "1'est of the 
Marcia Johnston Parcel described below. 
, 
,;,'.,<\_-#:! 
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(b) JJ:fa.rcia J olmston Parcel of 2.4 acres of the Grubb Land 
Development purchased for $5,750.00 from Marcia G. John-
ston and husband by deed dated April 18, 1950, and recorded 
May 1, 1950, in Deed Book 436, Page 401, which parcel front-
ing on State Secondary Road Route No. 685 is bounded on the 
west by the Brown Parcel and on the east by Orestmoor Drive. 
( c) Lawrence Johnson Parcel being Lots 8 and 9, Block 1, 
Section 1, Crestmoor subdivision, purchased for $1,600.00 
from Lawrence D. Johnson and wife by deed dated April 18, 
1950, anci recorded :May 1, 1950, in Deed Book 436, Page 405, 
which lots form the west boundary of the property of the com-
plainant J olm. 
(cl) Cole Parcel being· Lots 7 and 10, Block 1, Section 1, 
Orostmoor subdivision, purchased for $1,350.00 from H. G. 
Cole, Jr. and wife by deed dated March 8, 1950, and recorded 
~larch 13, 1950, in Deed Book 433, Page 307, which lots are 
approximately 200 feet east of the property of the complain-
ant \Veaver. 
( e) Levell Parcel being Lot 1, Block 3, Section 1, Crest-
moor subdivision, purchased for $1,300.00 from Olen F. 
Levell, Jr. and wife by deed dated March 11, 1950, recorded 
l\Iarch 20, 1950, in Deed Book 434, Page 67, which lot is ap-
proximately 50 feet east of the property of the complainant 
·weaver. . 
pag·e 4 ~ 3. That despite several separate sets of duly re-
corded covenants, restrictions, and conditions, ex-
pressly and impliedly prohibiting the erection of non-resi-
dential structures, and in complete disregard and intentional 
violation thereof, the defendant corporation bas used and is 
now using· portions of its land mentioned in Paragraph 2 
above, and especially the Marcia Johnston Parcel and the 
Lawrence Johnson Parcel, for purposes other than residen-
tial in tlmt it has erected for commercial use a large, un-
sightly, obnoxious and dang·erous high voltage transmission 
steel tower standing over 100 feet high; that by this arbitrary 
action, the defendant corporation without due process of law 
has violated and continues to violate the vested property 
rights of the complainants, which were secured to them by 
the aforementioned and hereinafter described sets of restric-
tive covenants, and has taken and damaged the homes and 
property of the complainants as hereinafter more fully set 
forth. 
4. That the several exclusively residential developments 
and subdivisions in which the complainants own lots or 
parcels that are affected by the defendant corporation's arbi-
trary action are as follows: . 
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BELLE AIR: ( also lmffwn as Belle Aire Court). The area 
originally occupied by this residential subdivision was first 
subdivided into some hventy lots by the late F. V{. Brown, 
widower. A plat of this subdivision was prepared bv Wil-
liam Bradford, C. P. E., dated ,July 23 1921. and was recorclecl 
in Plat Book 1 Page 268. Thereafter upon the death of F. ,v. 
Brown the area comprising Belle Air, excluding several deeds 
of parts thereof that had been made by Mm in his lifetime, 
was partitioned among his four daughters by a deed of parti-
tion clntecl April 17, 1930, and recorded in Deed Book 195, 
Page 379. From time to time these lots ltave again been sub-
divided and resubdivided. The lots partitioned to one daugh-
ter, Emma Vv. B1·0,,ln Moore, including original 
page 5 ~ Lots 5, 10, (wl1ich border Crestmoor Drive) and 
Lot 15, have been made expressly subject, for the 
most part, to the identical covenants, restrictions, and con-
ditions applying to tbe Crestmoor subdivision in the deeds 
by which thev have been conveyed from her. From the lots 
partitioned to Emma V-l. Brow1i °MOOl'C have come the parcels 
of tlw complaillants Grogan and Parsons. 
GRUBB LAND DEVELOPMENT: Originally, James 
Grubb was the owner of a 93 1/8 acre tract. By instrument 
dated July 30, 1940, portions of this tract were contracted for 
and purchased by Jay E. Rauch and his wife and Harry 
Stover Shultz from the heirs of .James Grubb upon the writ-
ten agreement ,vith them that the said portions being pur-
chased and the remaining· portion of the Grubb Land which 
actuallv fronted on State Secondary Road Route No. 685 and 
which continued to front along the· continuation of this road 
along the old road on the uorth side of the Grubb Land and 
to a depth extending back 500 feet from said road would all 
be covered by certain restrictions, as it was then contemplated 
that the bal~nce of the Grubb Laud would be subdivided, de-
veloped and sold from time to time as residential lots. 
To insure the residential cha ractcr of their respeetive prop-
erties, the said Rauchs, Schultz, and the Grubb heirs by a 
Special Commissioner entered hito an agreement dated No-
vember 23, 1940, rmcl recorded December 30, 1940, in Deed 
Book 281, Page 357, which placed upon the vnrious parcels 
being· sold to Hauch and Schultz and on the· above-described 
remaining portion of the Grubb Land, the following condi-
tions and restrictions as covenants running· with the laud: 
"1. That there shall not for a period of 25 years from Sep-
tember 1, 1940, be sold or lensed to or occupied by Negroes 
or Syrians ( except as domestic servants) all or any part 
thereof. 
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'' 2. That no residence or dwelling l10use shall be built upon 
the said tracts ( exclusive of out-buildings) costing less than 
· $4,000.00 for a like period. 
page 6 ~ "3. That the aforesaid covenants shall consti-
tute and be considered covenants running with the 
land and shall be included in any conveyances of all or any 
parts of said tracts hereafter made during said period.'' 
. From the properties of the Rauchs and Shultz liave come 
the parcels of the complainants Meagher, Patton (Montague) 
and Allen. From the remaining portion of the Grubb Land 
fronting· on State Secondary Road Route No. 685 have come 
the parcels of the defendant corporation hereinabove identi-
fied as the Brown Parcel and the Marcia Johnston Parcel. 
All of these parcels have been conveyed expressly subject to 
the above restrictions, as well as additional restrictions 
hereinafter set forth. · 
CREST::M:OOR: The area occupied by the Crestmoor sub-
division was originally a part of the 93 1/8 acres owned by 
James Grubb. By deed dated .July 14, 1945, and recorded in 
Deed Book 324, Page 345, the Grubb heirs conveyed to G. G. 
Fralin a 78 · acre tract expressly subject to the above condi-
tions and restrictions. This tract was first subdivided into 
residential lots now comprising· Crestmoor subdivision by 
G. G. Fralin, et al, and a plat thereof dated January 10, 1946, 
was recorded in Plat Book 2, Pag·e 195. Upon this subdivision 
there were imposed additional restrictions, including the spe-
cific provision that no portion of the land should be improved 
or occupied for other than residential purposes as well as 
other covenants, r·estrictions, and conditions as follows: 
'' All persons who shall acquire any land described in this 
deed shall take and hold the same, and ag·ree and covenant 
with the proprietors of said land, and their assigns and each 
of them, to conform to and observe the following· restrictions 
and conditions as to the use thereof. All of which building 
restrictions and conditions shall continue and be binding upon 
the owners of any part of the land hereby conveyed and their 
respective heirs, successors and assigns for a period of 50 
years from January 1, 1946; and it is covenanted and agreed 
as a part of the consideration of this deed, and of the price 
at w·hich said land is sold, that the following conditions shall 
be and the same are hereby made covenants running· with the 
land hereby conveyed and binding upon the party of the sec-
ond part and all persons claiming by, throug·h or under him, 
her or it. 
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page 7 ~ 1. No portion of the land hereby conveyed shall 
be sold, leased, used, owned, or occupied by any per-
son or persons of any other than the Caucasian race, and 
more specifically, no portion of tlie land hereby conveyed shall 
be sold to, leased, used, owned or occupied by Negroes, Turks, 
Greeks, Assyrians, Syrians, l\Iougolians, or by any person 
who belong·s to any race, creed, or sect which holds, recog-
nizes, or observes any day of the week other than the first day 
of the week to be the Sabbath or his Sabbath, or any corpora-
tion or clan composed of or controlled by any such person. 
This covenant shall not prevent persons who lawfully may 
occupy said premises from having negro domestic servants 
working and residing in their homes or servant's quarters. 
2. No portion of the land hereby conveyed s11all be im-
proved or occupied for other than residential purposes, and 
no flat, apartment house, trailer, or temporary living quarters 
shall be erected thereon. 
3. No residence shall be erected on the lot hereby conveyed 
costing less than $7,500.00 (necessary outbuildings, such as 
garages, servant's quarters, tool sl1ecls excepted), and the 
ground floor square foot area shall not be less than 800 square 
feet in the case of a one floor residence, nor less than 600 
square feet in the case of a one and one-half or two story 
residence. 
4. No residence or any portion thereof shall be erected 
clm;er than fifty feet to the front property line of the lot on 
which it is erected, and any such house erected on the prop-
ertv must face the street in front of the lot on which it is built. 
5. No residence shall be erected on the lot hereby conveyed 
nearer than 20 feet to the adjoining property line, and not 
more than one residence shall be erected on anv one lot. The 
side line restrictions shall not apply to a garage erected on 
the rear one-third of a lot. This side line restriction shall 
not prevent the owner of two adjoining lots from erecting· a 
residence on the restricted area behveen said two adjoining 
lots, but in such case not more than one residence shall be 
erected on the said two lots. 
6. No intoxicatingJ liquors shall be sold on any of tlle prem-
ises hei·eby conveyed, nor shall any cow·s, hog·s, or shMp, be 
kept there'on; nor shall any noxious or offensive trade be 
carried on upon any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon 
which may be or become a nuisance to the neighborhood. 
7. No part of the property hereby conveyed which faces a 
street shall be used for agricultural purposes or poultry rais-
ing, but such activities shall be conducted on the rear one-11alf 
portion of the lot hereby conveyed. No poultry house shall 
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be erected on the premises over one story high or containing 
over 180 square feet area and there shall be but one such house 
per lot. 
8. Invalidation of any one of these covenants, by judgment 
or court order, shall in no wise effect any of the other pro-
. visions which shall remain in full force and 1 effect. 
page 8 ~ 9. Nothing in tbe above provisions shall prevent 
any lawful owner from giving good and unencum-
bered legal title to any· financial or lending· institution, free 
from all restrictions; but in the event of a foreclosure, the 
property foreclosed shall be sold subject to all of the above 
restrictions and covenants. 
10. If tbe parties hereto, or any of them, or their heirs and 
assigns, shall violate or attempt to violate any of the cove-
nants or restrictions herein before January 1, 1996, it shall 
be lawful for any other person or persons owning· any other 
lot or lots in said development or subdivision to prosecute any 
proceedings at law or in equity against tbe person or persons 
violating or attempting to violate any such covenant or re-
striction, and either to prevent him or them from so doing or 
to recover damages or other dues for such violation." 
GRUBB LAND DEVELOPMENT: (continued). In order 
that this general residential area, including the Crestmoor 
subdivisions and the Grubb Land Development, might be uni-
form in its residential requirements, and in order to make the 
Grubb Land Development more exclusive, tbe Crestmoor re-
strictions and conditions were expressly imposed upon the 
various parcels in the Grubb Laud Development as follows : 
(a) l\IAl{CIA JOHNSTON PARCEL (now owned by the 
defendant corporation)-by verbatim insertion in the deed 
elated March 16, 1946, and recorded in Deed Book 334, Page 
511, from G. G. Fralin, et al, to Marcia G. Johnston. 
(b) BROWN PARCEL (now owned by the defendant cor-
poration)-by being made expressly subject to the Crestmoor 
restrictions by reference in the deeds from Mary T. Taylor 
and ·w. E. Blackwell, dated June 23, 1948, and recorded in 
Deed Book 394, Page 445 and Deed Book 394, Page 448, re-
spectively, to the recorded covenants, restrictions, and con-
ditions contained on the l\lap of Crestmoor. 
(c) MEAGHER PARCEL-by being· made expressly sub-
ject to the Crestmoor restrictions by reference in the deeds 
from Mary T. Taylor and W. E. Blackwell, dated June 23, 
1948, and recorded in Deed Book 394, Page 445 and Deed Book 
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394, Page 448, respectively, to the recorded cove-
pag·e 9 ~ nants, restrictions, and conditions contained on the 
Map of Crcstmoor. 
(d) PATTON (:MONTAGUE) PAR.CEL-by including in 
the deed from Thomns F1. ·w ortham, dated Aug·ust 22, 1946, and 
recorded in Deed Book 344, Page 327, the Crestmoor restric-
tions with several minor modifications. 
( e) ALLEN PARCEL-by being made expressly subject 
to the Crestmoor restrictjons by reference in the deed from 
Lester V. Wimmer, dated August 14, 1948, and recorded in 
Deed Book 400, Page 185, to the recorded covenants, restric-
tions, and conditions contained on the Map of Orestmoor. 
5. That relying upon tlie residential character of tllis area 
as assured by the aforesaid several separate sets of restric-
tions, covenants, and conditions, which being equitable servi-
tudes enurecl to their benefit and thereby constituted vested 
property rig·bts, the complainants at great cost and expense 
planned for the erection of their permanent homes. 
6. That when it became known that the defendant corpora-
tion was planning to locate a main trunk high voltag·e trans-
mission line through this residential area calling for three 
100-foot steel towers adjacent to each other, protest was made 
by various property owners affected, but tl1eir objections were 
unheeded. Although the defendant corporation chose to 
ignore the protests of the complninants, it did compensate in 
agreements to which the complainants were not parties, the 
following persons owning lots in Crestmoor, to-wit: 
Frank W. Martin, et al $17,227.80 (D. B. 443, P. 356) 
Grover G. Fralin, et al 16,772.20 (D. B. 443, P. 362), and 
W. II. Tinsley, et al 4,500.00 (D. B. 443, P. 370), 
$38,500.00 
for a right of way and easement only over their respective 
lands and in consideration of a release for: 
(1) Construction damage in the erection of electric power 
transmission lines. 
page 10 ~ (2) Darnng·e, if any, to the residue of the lands 
owned by the parties jointly. 
(3) Damage, if any, to the adjacent and adjoining lands of 
the parties. 
7. That the defendant corporation also agreed in each in-
stance referred to in Paragraph 6 above to indemnify and 
\ 
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save harmless the parties from whom it had purchased the re-
lease and easement. from the claims of all persons based on 
alleged violation of the restrictive covenants and conditions 
of 1~ecord on the :Map of Crestmoor or contained in convey-
ances of lots therein Rituafod., hut the defendant corporation 
failed to negotiate with the complainants for the purchase of 
either their land or their property rig·hts. 
8. That when in May, 1951, excavations were observed be-
ing made upon the Marcia J ohnst.on Parcel indicating that 
the defendant corporation was proceeding with its plans to 
erect a structure of a non-residential character, presump-
tivelv in connection with a main trunk high voltage transmis-
sion "'line, a strong letter of protest WTitien on b~lrnlf of the 
complainants was delivered to the defendant corporation and-
its counsel calling upon the defendant corporation to desist 
from using its property for other than residential purposes, 
a copy of which letter is atta~hed hereto as Exhibit "1''. 
9. That followiiw; receipt of this letter of protest, the com-
plainants were informed that the defendant corporation had 
n deadline to meet and would not stop for negotiations, and, 
thereafter, the defendant corporation erected a large, un-
sig·htly, obnoxious and dangerous steel tower with three cross-
arms and supporting seven high voltage transmission lines 
upon the Marcia ,J olmston Parcel mid one upon the Lawrence 
,J olmson Parcel and ]ms announced further plans to locate ad-
ditional towers of similar design on its land west of the ones 
now erected. That the unnatural and ugly struc-
page 11 ~ tures now standing· are of such great height, to-wit 
over 100 feet, that they are clearly visible from the 
properties of the complainants and spoil a beautiful and 
scenic view unparalleled in the suburbs of Roanoke, thereby 
greatly detracting from the value of the general area as an 
exclusively residential district and being particularly obnoxi-
ous to the complainants who surround them. That signs have 
been placed .upon tbe towers reading- ''Danger'' and '' High 
Voltage'', but the towers are not fenced or in any way pro-
tected from the curiosity of the children who abound in the 
n rea, their ignorance, their heedlessness of danger or their 
known love of adventure. That there is attached to one of 
the vertical members of these towers a series of rungs by 
which they can be climbed. That these towers, being pecu-
liarly attractive to children, constitute a continuing danger 
to them and a constant source of worry to the complainants 
who are their parents and neighbors. That these towers are 
dangerous not only as they stand but because of the possibil-
ity of high voltage which might seep into the neighboring 
R. L. :Meagher, et al. v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. 11 
lands or from the hazard that would result if any one of the 
seven high voltage wires supported by each tower were 
caused to fall to the g-ro1md. That the presence of these 
towers, wires and crossarms adversely affects radio and tele-
vision reception and further has curtailed and will continue 
to curtail the full development of the area as a residential 
section. 
10. That by reason of the aforesaid action of the defend-
ant corporation in. the erection and maintenance of said 
towers in complete disregard of the vested property rights of 
the complainants, secured to them by tl1e aforesaid sets of 
restrictive covenants, their property has been damaged, 
taken, and confiscated in a highly arbitrary, unconstitutional 
and unscrupulous manner without due process of law in calcu-
lated defiance of one of the basic tenets of our way of life, 
namely, that private property shall not be taken or damaged 
· without compensation. 
page 12 ~ 11. That the defendant corporation has been 
g·iven ample opportunity to negotiate for the pur-
chase or the taking of the complainants' property rights, but 
although a public utility corporation licensed by the Common-
wealth in theory to serve all the citizens of Virginia and re-
spect their rights, it continues to ignore the complainants and 
their rights and appears bent upon accomplishing its own 
purposes and plans notwithstanding and in complete disre-
gard of the obvious effect upon the legal and equitable rig·hts 
of others. 
12 ... Wherefore, your complainants respectively pray: 
(a) That the defendant corporation be enjoined from using 
its property for other than residential purposes and be re-
quired to conform with and abide by the restrictions, cove-
nants, and conditions applying to its lands as hereinabove set 
forth. 
(b) That if for any reason the Court should determine that 
the complainants are not entitled to the injunctive relief 
prayed for and if it should further determine that the prop-
erty which the defendant corporation bas arbitrarily damaged, 
taken, and confiscated is a proper subject for the exercise of 
the privilege of eminent domain and that the defendant cor-
poration has not forfeited its said privilege by its arbitrary 
action, that the defendant corporation then be ordered to ex-
ercise forthwith its privilege of eminent domain with respect 
to the rights of the complainants in strict accord with the re-
quirements provided by law. 
( c) That the complainants be afforded such other relief as 
the above circumstances may require. 
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page 13 ~ Respectfully submitte<l, 
, RICHARU L. :MEAGHER and LAURA A. C. MEAGHER; 
CHARLES·S. PATTON, JR. and FRANCES S. PATTON; 
J. KYLE MONTAGUE ·and LUCY M. MONTAGUE; 
vV. EARL ALLEN, JR. and MILDRED H. ALLEN; 
T. J. ORANDER an<l NELLIE G. GRANDER; 
ROBERT P. GROGAN and MAUDE M. GROGAN; 
FLORENCE LINDElVI JOHN; 
LAKE L. NEWTON; and 
GEORGE W. PARSONS and MIRIAM BOYER PARSONS 
By Counsel. 
HERMAN.WEAVER 
By Counsel. 
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• 
• • • 
• 
.. 
Filed in the Clerk's Office the 7 day of January, 1952. 
Teste: 
U. C. LOGAN, D. C. 
page 15 ~ EXHIBIT '' 1. '' 
Appalachian Electric Power Company 
40 Franklin Road, s·w 
Roanoke, Virginia 
Gentlemen: 
May 14, 1951 
Some time ago we conferred with your representatives and 
counsel in protest against your proposal to run a three tower 
power line through the residential development of the Grubb 
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land in Roanoke County adjoining Belle Air and through the 
Crestmoor subdivision which was developed from the Grubb 
land. It is our understanding that since our conf ere nee you 
have boug·ht outright the property of some owners who would 
have been affected by your plans and you have compensated 
others. For some reason unexplained to us you have arbi-
trarily ignored the protests of our clients and are apparently 
proceeding with your original plans, notwithstanding the 
vested property rights of many property owners in the Grubb 
development, in Crestmoor and in Belle Air. These owners 
are in our opinion entitled to the full protection of the cove-
nants and restrictions established to protect them. Excava-
tion upon the ground of a site marked "Tower #3" indicates 
that you must intend to use the property for other than resi-
dental purposes. You are the ref ore again advised that prop-
erty owners in the area affected object to your use of the land 
for what appear to be other than residential purposes and ex-
pect to resort to leg·al proceedings to protect their rights. 
This notice is being given on behalf of the following: 
Richard L. Meagher and Laura A. C. Meagher 
W. Earl Allen, Jr. and Mildred H. Allen 
J. Kyle Montague, III and Lucy M. :Montague 
Malcolm P. Dillard and Marie B. Dillard 
T. J. Orancler 
Robert P. Grogan and Maude M. Grogan 
Dr. J.E. John and Florence L. John 
George vV. Parsons, Jr. and Miriam B. Parsons 
James A. Newton and Lake L. Newton 
Very truly yours, 
DODSON & PENCE 
CC : vVoods, Rogers, Muse & Walker 
• • • • 
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• • .. 
14 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
DEMURHER. 
Now comes the defendant, Appalachian Electric Power 
Company, and says that the bill of complaint exhibited against 
it by Richard L. l\foagher et al, is not sufficient in law: 
(1) As to the complainants, Grander, Grogan, John, New-
ton and Parsons, because: 
(a) The property of these complainants is wholly situate 
within the Belle .1\..ir subdivision in which subdivision the de-
fendant has no property or property rights; 
(b) These complainants have no land, property, interest or 
estate in the Grubb Land Development or Crestmoor Subdi-
vision or in the restrictive covenants imposed for the benefit 
of the owners of lots in the said subdivisions; 
( c) The defendant has not, under the Constitution and 
laws of the state, taken or damaged any property of these 
complainants; and 
( d) Any damage caused to the property of these complain-
ants is incidental to the lawful exercise of defendant's own 
property rights. 
(2) As to complainants, Montague, because they have no 
right, in law or in equity, as ''former owners'' of land in the 
Grubb Land Development to the relief soug·ht in 
page 19 ~ the bill. 
(3) As to complainants, Patton, because they 
have no right, in law or equity, to the relief sought in the bill, 
they having acquired their property subject to the uses made 
by defendant of its own property, and because of the grounds 
assigned in paragraph ( 4) l1ereof; 
( 4) As to complainants Weaver, Meagher, Allen and Pat-
ton, because : 
(a) Their rights, if any, in the restrictive covenants as to 
the use of other land in Crestmoor and the Grubb Land De-
velopment are not "property" within the meaning of the Con-
stitution and laws of the state, dealing with the taking and 
damaging of property for public uses; and 
(b) The defendant's use of its own property in these sub-
divisions is not violative of any restrictive covenants which 
may attach thereto. 
R. L. Meagher, et al. v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. 15 
(5) As to all of the complainants because they have not 
alleged any element of damage compensable under the Con-
stitution and the laws of the state. 
All of which appears from the allegations of the bill. 
"'WHEREFORE, tl1e bill should be dismissed as to all the 
complainants at their costs. 
Respectfully, 
APPALACHIAN ELECTRIC POWER COMP ANY, 
a Corporation, 
By Couns~l. 
-·' 
WOODS, ROGERS, MUSE & WALKER p. d. 
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Filed in the Clerk's Office, Circuit Court of Roanoke 
County, Va., Feb. 7, 1952. 
Teste: 
ROY K. BROWN, Clerk. 
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Re: Richard L. Meagher, et als v. Appalachian Electric 
Power Company, a corporation. 
Gentlemen: 
Upon consideration of the pleadings, the oral argument and 
the submission of the written authorities, I find as follows: 
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(1) That Charles S. Patton and :b,rances S. Patton, having 
acquired the lot from J. Kyle Montague and Lucy M. Mon-
tague, subsequent to the date the several tracts were acquired 
by the defendant, have no rig·ht in equity to enjoin the cfofend-
unt corporation in the use being made of its property since 
they have suffered no damage. 
(2) J. Kyle Montague and Lucy M. Montague having sold 
their lot to the Pattons, and not now being owners in the 
Grubb Land Development subdivision, have no right in equity 
to enjoin the defendant corporation for the alleged violations 
of the restrictive covenants. If they sufferred any loss in the 
sale of their lot by reason of the alleged violations of the re-
strictive covenants by the defendant, their remedy, if any, is 
an action at law for damages. 
(3) The complainants, T. J. Orlander and Nellie G. Orlan-
der, Robert P. Grogan and Maude l\L Grogan, Florence 
Lindem John, Lake L. Newton, George vV. Parsons and Mir-
iam Boyer Parsons, owners of lots in the Belle Aire subdivis-
ion, have no right in equity to enjoin the defendant corpora-
tion for the alleged violation of the restrictive covenants since 
there is no privity of contract. It clearly appears from the 
pleadings that none of the property o,vned by the defendant 
is any part of the Belle Aire subdivision. lt is well settled 
that the lot owners of one subdivision have no right to ~nforce 
the restrictive covenants of another and separate subdivision. 
To this extent I am of the opinion Section 55-22 of the Code 
of 1950, has no application to the facts as alleged in the bill 
of complaint in this suit. 
page 22 ~ ( 4) This leaves for determination the rights, if 
any, of the remainding complainants, lot owners in 
Grubb Land Development subdivision and in Crestmoor sub-
division. The pleadings raise the following questions:· 
(a) Are restrictive covenants property rights, givi11g ad-
jacent ovmers in the same subdivision the right to enforce or 
he compensated where damages are alleged. 
The question is a novel one h1 the state, never having been 
decided by our Supreme Court of Appeals. However, it has 
been determined in other states, the authorities being in con-
flict. It is conceded the defendant is vested with the power 
of eminent domain. Upon an examination of all the authori-
ties, I am of the opinion that where all the lots in a subdivis-
ion are sold under covenants that they would be used for resi-
dential purposes only, and one or more of the lots are used by 
a public utility, vested with the power of eminent domain, for 
public purposes, owners of the other lots do not have any in-
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terest or ownership in the lot thus so used, so as to entitle 
them to' damages or compensation because of such use. See 
Anderson v. Lynch, (Ca. 1939) 3 S. E. 2d 85, 122 A. L. R. 
1456. 
·while the facts in Anllerson v. Lynch are different than 
those in the case at bar, the principle is the same, and the con-
clusion reached in that case, as applied to the case at bar, so 
nearly conforms with my opinion, that I find it to be conclu-
sive in the decision of this issue. The decision in Anderson v. 
Lynch further finds, and I concur, that restrictive covenants 
intended to restrict the right of public use would be contrary 
to public policy and void. Further, even if the owners of lots 
might sustain some damage by the public use, any damage 
suffered by them would be merely consequential or inc-idential. 
·while there are authorities to the contrary, discussed in 
Anderson v. Lynch, I am of the opinion Anderson v. Lynch is 
the most logical. It is true that the Supreme Court of .Ap-
peals of Virginia in Nitsbaimi v. Norfolk, 151 Va. 801, 145 S. 
E. 257 said Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S. Vv. 1024, 17 
A. L. R. 543, is good law, the question was not before our 
court for consideration, and the statement cannot be consid-
ered as even dicta. Peters v. Buckner holds to the contrary 
to Anderson v. Lynch. 
(b) Has the defendant violated the restrictive covenants. 
A comparison of the restrictive covenants in the case at bar 
with those under consicleration by the court in Stokely v. 
Owens, 189 Va. 248, 52 S. E. 2d 164, would indicate that there 
has been no violation by the defendant he1·e unless erection 
of the steel towers can be construed to be '' noxious or offen-
sive", and I do not think it can be so construed. However, 
in view of the conclusion reached under ( 4) a, supra, it is not 
necessary to decide this issue, except so far as it might apply 
to complainants Montague. 
page 23 ~ (c) Do the complainants allege damages com-
pensable atlaw? None of the steel towers, wires 
or cross arms supporting the wires touch or cross any of the 
property of the complainants. There is no physical connec-
tion. Destroying the scenic view, radio and television inter-
ference and possible danger by falling wires, as well as the 
attractive nuisance, alleged in the bill of complaint are con-
sequential and or inC'identfol. A side of the view being de-
stroyed, none of the other allegations may ever occur and are 
speculative. So far as the view is concerned this is not a 
property right so long as it does not cut off light or air. See 
Tidewater R. R. Co. v. Shartzer, 107 Va. 562, 59 S. E. 562; 
Lambert v. City of Norfolk, 108 Va. 250, 61 S. E. 776. 
\.. 
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While it may be true the full development of the area a~ a 
residential section may be curtailed, and that the erection 
of the high steel towers may be objectionable and detract 
from the beauty of the scenic view, and as a result affect the 
value of the owners in the subdivision, the use made of the 
property by the defendant is a necessary use for the pnblic, 
and as held in Andei·son v. Lynch, must give away as a matter 
of public policy, the damages not being compensable at law. 
It was never contemplated nor can it be so interpted that use 
of ·the lots must be restricted to prevent use by the puhlie 
where necessary. To hold otherwise would restrict uses of 
all kinds where needed by the public. Streets could not 11e 
opened· or widened, schools could not be built to sei·ve these 
very same complainants, or any type of public service ren-
dered without compensating all owners in each subdivision. 
The cost would be prohibitive. 
A decree may be entered sustaining the demurrer and dis-
missing the bill at the cost of the complainants. This opinion 
will be made part of the record in this cause. · 
page 24 ~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL L. ABBOTT, 
Judge. 
. FIRST AND FINAL DECREE. 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the bill of 
complaint, the demurrer of the defendant, oral argument 
heretofore heard by the court on June 2, 1952 and written 
memoranda of law filed by counsel for complainants and de-
fendants. 
And the court having maturely considered the questions of 
law raised by the demurrer and being of the opinion that the 
demurrer should be sustained and the bill dismissed for the 
reasons set forth in the court's letter of June 24, 1952 to coun-
~el, a copy of which letter of opinion is hereby made a part of 
the record, the court doth Adjudge and Decree that the de-
murrer be, and the same hereby is, sustained and that the bill 
of complaint be, and the same hereby is, dismissed at the costs 
of the complainants. 
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To which ruling of the court, complainants by counsel ob-
jected and excepted, and assigned as their grounds of objec-
tion and exception that the ruling is contrary to the law. 
The clerk is directed to forthwith furnish certi-
page 25 r fied copies of this decree to any party requesting 
the same. 
• 
Enter. 6/28/52. 
E. L.A. 
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• * • 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
Notice is hereby given that the above-named complainants 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia from the 
final decree of the Circuit Court for the County of Roanoke, 
Virginia, entered in this cause on the 28th day of June, 1952, 
and said complainants do hereby assig11 as error the following 
actions of the trial court: 
1. In ruling that the defendant corporation's use and in-
tended use of its own lands in erecting steel towers thereon 
was not in violation of any of the restrictions, covenants and 
conditions ·applying to said lands. 
2. In ruling that the restrictions, covenants and conditions 
applying to the defendant corporation's land afford no prop-
erty rig·hts to the complainants and are not enforceable ag·ainst 
the defendant corporation because it is a public utility with 
the power of eminent domain. 
3. In ruling that even if the restrictions, covenants and 
conditions applying to the defendant corporation's land were 
enforceable, they could not be enforced by certain of the com-
plainants as follows : 
page 27 r (a) In equity by the complainants Patton since 
they have suffered no damage. 
(b) Except in an action at law by the complainants Mon-
tague for they have sold their land to the Pattons. 
(c) In equity by the Complainants Grander, Grogan, John, 
Newton, and Parsons since there was no privity of contract. 
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4. In ruling that the complainants did not allege damages 
which are compensable at law. 
5. In sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill of 
complaint. 
RICHARD L. MEAGHER and LAURA A. C. MEAGHER; 
CHARLES S. PATTON, JR. and FRANCES S. PATTON; 
~f. KYLE MONTAGUE and LUCY M. MONTAGUE; 
1V. EARL ALLEN, Jli. and MILDRED H. ALLEN; 
T. J. GRANDER and NELLIE G. GRANDER; 
ROBERT P. GROGAN and MAUDE M. GROGAN; 
FLORENCE LINDEM JOHN; 
LAKE L. NEvVTON; and 
GEORGE W. PARSONS and MIRIAM BOYER PARSONS. 
By Counsel. 
HERMAN "WEA VER. 
By Counsel. 
• • • 
Filed on the Clerk's Office Circuit Court of Roanoke County, 
Aug. 19, 1952. 
Teste: 
ROY K. BROWN, Clerk . 
• • 
A Copy-Teste : 
H. G. TURNER, Clerk. 
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